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A COMPARISON OF NORMS-RIGHTS OF THE
MENTALLY ILL AND ALLEGEDLY MENTALLY ILL
LISA CHALIDZE*
"Everyone has the right to recognition
everywhere as a person before the law."'
This article will discuss the legal rights of both mentally ill
and allegedly mentally ill persons. Existing legal norms will be
analyzed and compared to certain proposed norms. In the ensu-
ing three-part analysis, the first section will deal with how the
law in the United States treats mental illness litigation as con-
cerns civil commitment, criminal commitment, and the right to
refuse treatment. The second section will describe the corre-
sponding procedures in the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
(with the exception of the right to refuse treatment-no such
right is recognized there). The third section proposes three sets
of guidelines for the treatment of the mentally ill, for the pur-




There are two traditional bases of authority invoked to jus-
tify involuntary civil commitment. 2 The first is the police power.
Justifications for the invocation of this power include protection
of citizens from harm (physical, mental, emotional, and some-
times financial) caused by the mental illness of others.3 The sec-
ond ground of authority is parens patriae, or the role of the
state as guardian. Functions of the state in this area include pre-
*J.D. cum laude, New York Law School 1983.
1. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, Art. 6, 3 U.N. GAOR, G.A. Res. 217, U.N.
Doc. 1/777 (1948).
2. Silverberg, The Civil Commitment Process: Basic Considerations, in 1 LEGAL
RIGHTS OF THE MENTALLY HANDICAPPED 105 (1974) [hereinafter cited as LEGAL RIGHTS].
3. Id.
HUMAN RIGHTS ANNUAL
vention of self-inflicted harm, treatment of an individual for the
purposes of curing the illness or of rehabilitation, and custodial
care of those considered to be untreatable."
In the United States, the responsibility for mental health
care lies for the most part with the individual states and not
with the federal government.' Thus, varying standards are ap-
plied to determine whether an individual is an appropriate sub-
ject for commitment. Under one standard, certain state statutes
allowed involuntary commitment on the basis of a need of care
and treatment for mental illness.' This standard required no
showing of dangerousness or harm to the individual or to others.
It was possible that a judicial interpretation might find an im-
plied requirement of dangerousness in the statute, but this was
by no means certain. The problem of vagueness is further exac-
erbated by the various definitions offered for the term "mental
illness." One typical statute defines a "mental disorder" as
merely "any organic, mental, or emotional impairment which
has substantial adverse effects on an individual's cognitive or vo-
litional functions."
7
A second, and more enlightened, standard of commitment
requires some showing of dangerousness, such as "danger to
himself or others" due to mental illness.8 While this element
may be considered a greater obstacle to commitment, obvious
problems remain. Often, neither "danger" nor "mental illness" is
4. Id.
5. See generally Developments in the Law-Civil Commitment of the Mentally Ill,
87 HARV. L. REV. 1190 (1974) (survey and analysis of American case law and statutes
regarding civil commitment) (hereinafter cited as DEVELOPMENTS].
6. Maycock v. Martin, 157 Conn. 56, 63, 245 A.2d 574, 577-78 (1968), cert. denied,
393 U.S. 1111 (1969) (upheld constitutionality of state statute which required for con-
finement only that subject be "mentally ill and a fit subject for treatment"; plaintiff was
confined to a state mental hospital as one requiring treatment for his own welfare);
Fhagen v. Miller, 29 N.Y.2d 348, 355, 278 N.E.2d 615, 617, 328 N.Y.S.2d 393, 397 (1972),
cert. denied, 409 U.S. 845 (1972) (one afflicted by mental disease as defined by state
statute need not be violent or dangerous to justify a short confinement prior to notice
and an opportunity to be heard).
7. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 71.05.020(2) (1979).
8. Ex parte Romero, 51 N.M. 201, 204, 181 P.2d 811, 815 (Sup. Ct. 1947) (to continue
to detain inmate of sanitorium, who entered voluntarily for alcoholism treatment, with-
out a hearing to determine whether he is dangerous to himself or others, violates Consti-
tution). See also Cross v. Harris, 418 F.2d 1095 (D.C. Cir. 1969) (court must determine
whether subject is likely to injure himself or other persons if allowed to remain at
liberty).
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defined, leaving even a well-intentioned evaluator with little
guidance, and an ill-intentioned evaluator with dangerous dis-
cretion. There may be many motivations for abusing such dis-
cretion, such as the public pressure for "justice" after the ar-
rested party to a notorious crime has been declared incompetent
to stand trial.' In some jurisdictions, such political motives as
the desire to suppress dissent may prompt commitment.'0
What constitutes an appropriate standard for initial com-
mitment is only the first question to arise. Once the relevant
standard has been identified, the commitment decision must be
made. In most states, a certificate of commitment is required,"
but the actual certifying party varies widely from state to state.
Certifying parties can range, in an emergency situation, from a
mental health professional, to a police officer," or to a range of
other persons.1" In nonemergency situations it may be possible
for any individual to initiate commitment proceedings.1 4 In some
other situations this initiation may be limited to a close relative
or a person with whom the individual lives."' In still other juris-
dictions, any individual may set the initial commitment process
in motion, whether an emergency exists or not, but commitment
itself may not occur until there has been an administrative eval-
uation of the mental illness by the relevant mental health
agency.e
Many state commitment statutes have been sharply criti-
cized in recent years as unconstitutional violations of due pro-
cess.17 There is also a rapidly growing body of case law on
mental illness issues." These cases concern the application of
9. See note 55, infra.
10. See notes 83-93 and accompanying text, infra.
11. See, e.g., WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 71.05.160 (1979).
12. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 71.05.150(4)-.150(5) (1979).
13. N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW § 9.27(b) (McKinney 1973).
14. IOWA CODE § 229.6 (1976).
15. N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW § 9.27(b) (McKinney 1973).
16. IOWA CODE 229.6 (1976).
17. U.S. CONST. amend. V provides, in pertinent part, that no person shall "be de-
prived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law." U.S. CONST. amend. XIV
provides, in pertinent part, that no state shall "deprive any person of life, liberty, or
property, without due process of law." Id. at § 1.
18. It is not the purpose of this paper to detail the inhumane treatment typically
accorded the mentally ill. Others have chronicled the conditions in mental hospitals. See,
e.g., D. ROBINSON, PSYCHOLOGY & LAW (1980); T. SZAsZ, PSYCHIATRIC SLAVERY (1977).
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the entire panoply of rights now held by criminal prisoners in
penal institutions9 to the mental illness field. Relatively recent
developments have led one commentator to conclude that
"[t]here is no question that basic due process and equal protec-
tion are applicable to the civil commitment of the mentally
ill. . . The issue is what elements of due process are necessary
and applicable."20
This article will briefly sketch some of the battlegrounds in
mental illness litigation which center on procedural due process.
The Supreme Court of the United States has not yet addressed
these issues; it has been left to the lower courts to discuss the
various rights that may exist.
Initially, the rights of notice, a speedy hearing, the right to
counsel, and the privilege against self-incrimination were ac-
corded judicial recognition.2 1 As early as 1938, at least one
court2" recognized the necessity of such protection to a just com-
mitment system, and held that any deprivation of these rights
would violate the "liberty" section of the due process clause of
the fifth amendment. 23 In later years, the privilege against self-
incrimination was again deemed to be a part of constitutionally
19. The group of potentially affected persons is large. "In the year 1972, state and
county mental hospitals admitted 403,924 patients, of whom 169,032, or 41.8%, were
involuntarily committed." Developments, supra, note 5, at 1193 n.3 (citing a letter from
the National Institute of Mental Health to Harvard Law Review, May 4, 1974). The text
discusses the significant number of individuals civilly committed. Another source esti-
mated that, as of 1967, "[aln estimated 24 million people suffered from some form of
mental illness or mental defect. . ." out of a total national population numbering 197.8
million persons. N. KITTRIE, THE RIGHT TO BE DIFFERENT 4-5 (1971).
20. Schwartz, The Civil Commitment Process: Established and Emerging Rights, in
1 LEGAL RIGHTS 115 (1974).
21. Lessard v. Schmidt, 349 F. Supp. 1078 (E.D. Wis. 1972), vacated and remanded
414 U.S. 473 (1974), 379 F. Supp. 1376 (E.D. Wis. 1974) (three-judge court) (court en-
tered specific judgment in accordance with the prior opinion), vacated and remanded,
421 U.S. 957 (1975), 413 F. Supp. 1318 (E.D. Wis. 1976) (reinstated prior judgment of
the three-judge district court) (civil commitment procedures did not provide adequate
due process rights to those committed, including adequate notice, the right to counsel,
the availability of the privilege against self-incrimination, and the right to a speedy
hearing).
22. Barry v. Hall, 98 F.2d 222 (D.C. Cir. 1938) (habeas corpus proceeding by a man
confined on the basis of a letter from a non-medical public official).
23. U.S. CONST. amend. V provides, in pertinent part, that no person shall "be de-
prived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law." The court in Barry found
that "confinement in a mental hospital is as full and effective a deprivation of personal
liberty as is confinement in jail." 98 F.2d at 225.
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mandated due process,"4 as was the right to counsel2 5 and the
right to present one's own independent expert testimony.2
The question of the existence of a privilege against self-in-
crimination17 arose in the context of civil commitment proceed-
ings, when a person subject to civil commitment (perhaps as a
result of a finding of incompetency to stand trial) 28 was later
faced with a criminal charge, based in part on evidence obtained
at a civil commitment hearing. At least one court found this
privilege applicable at the civil commitment hearing.
29
B. Criminal Commitment
Commitment in the criminal context invariably raises differ-
ent issues, but as with civil commitment, it has been the subject
of much litigation. In this area the lower federal and state courts
have been active; thus, rights existing in some jurisdictions are
not necessarily recognized in others.3 In the criminal commit-
ment context, however, the Supreme Court has made major pro-
nouncements on the first two topics discussed below: compe-
tency to stand trials' and the "indefinite" period of
commitment.3 2
In Drope v. Missouri,33 the Supreme Court lield that a de-
fendant in a criminal proceeding cannot be tried unless he is
competent. This issue of competency concerns the defendant's
mental capacity at the time of trial and preparation of trial, as
opposed to the defendant's mental state at the time of the com-
mission of the crime. This latter time is the key to the defense of
24. People v. English, 31 Ill. 2d 301, 201 N.E.2d 455 (1964) (defendant not guilty of
contempt of court in refusing to submit to psychiatric examinations on the grounds that
he was protected by the privilege against self-incrimination). The court held that the
defendant could be compelled to submit to an examination, but not to answer incrimi-
nating questions.
25. Lessard, 349 F. Supp. at 1097.
26. Dixon v. Attorney General, 325 F. Supp. 966, 974 (M.D. Pa. 1971) (class action
brought by inhabitants of state mental hospital).
27. U.S. CONST. amend. V provides, in pertinent part, that no person "shall be com-
pelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself."
28. See notes 33, 36, 37 and accompanying text, infra.
29. Lessard, 349 F. Supp. at 1100.
30. D. ROBINSON, supra note 18, at 127-42.
31. Drope v. Missouri, 420 U.S. 162 (1975).
32. Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U.S. 715 (1972).
33. 420 U.S. 162 (1975).
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insanity,84 and perhaps to other mitigating factors, but it is a
completely separate issue from triability. As the court found in
Drope, "[iut has long been accepted that a person whose mental
condition is such that he lacks the capacity to understand the
nature and object of the proceedings against him, to consult
with counsel, and to assist in preparing his defense may not be
subjected to a trial."" The Court went on to note that its ap-
proved test of incompetence "[s]eeks to ascertain whether a
criminal defendant 'has sufficient present ability to consult with
his lawyer with a reasonable degree of rational understand-
ing-and whether he has a rational as well as factual under-
standing of the proceedings against him.' M7
The Drope principle does not govern those situations which
arise after a criminal suspect has been found incompetent to
stand trial. In considering this situation in the case of Jackson v.
Indiana,38 the Supreme Court held that for the individual to be
detained, he must be subject to the same civil commitment pro-
cess as any non-criminal defendant.39 In the view of the Court,
this procedure was demanded not only by due process, but also
by the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment.
40
In this context, equal protection prohibited the state from deny-
ing the incompetent the privileges available under a civil com-
mitment procedure merely on the basis that he had criminal
charges filed against him.4 This decision resulted in a prohibi-
tion of the previously widespread practice of detaining a non-
triable defendant by administrative decision for an indefinite
period of time. Such commitment could have lasted a lifetime,
even if the criminal charge only mandated a short sentence.42
34. See text accompanying notes 52-58, infra.
35. See, e.g., People v. Henderson, 60 Cal. 2d 482, 386 P.2d 677, 35 Cal. Rptr. 77
(1963) (diminished responsibility).
36. 420 U.S. at 171.
37. Id. at 172 (citing Dusky v. U.S., 362 U.S. 402 (1960)).
38. 406 U.S. 715 (1972).
39. Id. at 730.
40. Id.
41. Id. at 723.
42. See, e.g., United States ex. rel. von Wolfersdorf v. Johnston, 317 F. Supp. 66
(S.D.N.Y. 1970) (incarceration among the "criminally insane" for 20 years because of
status as insane defendant, presumed innocent, named in an untriable indidtment, vio-
lated protection against cruel and unusual punishment as it is enforceable against the
states under the fourteenth amendment).
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The potential for indefinite commitment existed at another
stage in a criminal proceeding as well: the diagnostic commit-
ment. The diagnostic commitment, necessary to determine ei-
ther the issue of triability or whether the defendant came within
a certain statutory category, could continue indefinitely.4 In
McNeil v. Director, Patuxent Institution," the Supreme Court
held that a brief diagnostic commitment to determine triability
is permissible, but the period of detention may not be unreason-
ably long.4 The Court has yet to define precisely what consti-
tutes an "unreasonably" long time, but it noted with approval
the Maryland statutory limitation of six months.4" This is a ma-
jor improvement over the situation in which commitment to de-
termine triability could be tantamount to life imprisonmeot.
The right to an evidentiary hearing has been required by
state courts.47 Thus, the basis for the recommended confinement
must be revealed and the potential confinee given the opportu-
nity to dispute it.4" A prepared plan of treatment for the benefit
of detained individuals, as well as periodic progress reports, are
required if the individual has been found incompetent to stand
trial.49 In relation to the incompetency-detention issue, the right
to a speedy trial has been accepted by at least one court as a
limitation on the length of the detention period." The right to a
speedy trial is impaired if the defendant is held for an unreason-
ably long time as incompetent to stand trial.5
Also provoking litigation has been the actual procedure to
be followed after a defendant has been acquitted by reason of
43. See, e.g., McNeil v. Patuxent Institution, 407 U.S. 245 (1972) (state lost the
power to hold detainee, convicted of two assaults and incarcerated in mental institution
awaiting examination and determination of his case, past the expiration of his five-year
sentence).
44. Id.
45. 407 U.S. at 250.
46. Id. (The court approved the Maryland statute, MD. ANN. CODE art. 31(b), § 7(a)
(1957 & Supp. 1966) (amended 1971).)
47. People v. English, 31 Ill. 2d 301, 201 N.E.2d 455 (1964).
48. Lessard v. Schmidt, 349 F. Supp. 1078, 1092 (D. Wis. 1972) (the potential con-
finee must be given notice setting forth the basis of detention and given a reasonable
opportunity to prepare for trial). Id. at 1092.
49. Ex parte Kent, 490 S.W.2d 649, 651 (Mo. 1973).
50. United States v. Pardue, 354 F. Supp. 1377, 1382 (D. Conn. 1973).
51. Id. at 1382.
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insantity.52 Acquittal by reason of insanity or mental illness is a
result of insanity at the time of the criminal act, and is separate
from the issue of whether the defendant is competent to stand
trial at a later date. 3 The plea of insanity typically is available
as a defense raised in the pleading stage of the trial."' Previ-
ously, a defendant could be automatically committed after such
an acquittal.5 5 Under Jackson,56  however, automatic commit-
ments are prohibited; the acquitted individual can be committed
only under the statutory civil commitment procedures.5
After a person has been civilly committed, even after an ac-
quittal by reason of insanity, he cannot be transferred to a
mental institution within the penal system, notwithstanding a
showing of dangerousness.58 Once an individual has been com-
mittfed, however, other controversies arise.
C. Right to Refuse Treatment Once Within the Institution
Inspiring much debate has been a deceptively simple issue:
can involuntarily committed patients refuse the treatment which
mental health professionals believe to be in the patients' best
interests?5" The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari
52. 420 U.S. 162 (1975).
53. Id. at 181, 182.
54. See, e.g., N.Y. PENAL LAW § 30.05 (McKinney 1981-82).
55. See, e.g., Daniel M'Naghten's Case, 8 Eng. Rep. 718 (H.L. 1843), reprinted in J.
HALL, B.J. GEORGE & R. FORCE, CRIMINAL LAW AND PROCEDURE (3d ed. 1976) at 433-34.
This is one of the most famous and enduring cases recognizing the defense of insanity.
This case gave rise to the M'Naghten rule:
To establish a defense on the ground of insanity, it must be clearly proved that
at the time of committing the act, the party accused was laboring under such a
defect of reason from disease of mind as not to know the nature and quality of
the act; or, if he did know it, that he did not know he was doing what was wrong.
Id. at 435. M'Naghten's defense was successful, and he was acquitted. In spite of his
acquittal, however, M'Naghten was never again free. He spent the remainder of his life,
first in the notorious Bethlehem ("Bedlam") Hospital and later in an institute for the
criminally insane. T. SzAsz, THE MANUFACTURE OF MADNESS at 295, 305-6 (1970).
56. Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U.S. 715, 738 (1972).
57. Id. at 738. See also Wilson v. State, 287 N.E.2d 875 (1972). Cf. Humphrey v.
Cady, 405 U.S. 504 (1972) (court may not commit rather than sentence a convicted sex
offender without observing civil commitment statutory guidelines); Baxstrom v. Herold,
383 U.S. 107 (1966) (prisoner at end of sentence entitled to a jury trial prior to civil
commitment, because all others civilly committed are so entitled).
58. Kesselbrenner v. Anonymous, 33 N.Y.2d 161, 305 N.E.2d 903, 350 N.Y.S.2d 899
(1973).
59. N.Y. Times, March 21, 1982, § 6, at 46, col. 3.
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to consider precisely this question in Mills v. Rogers.60
The defendants, doctors who forcibly administered psycho-
tropic or "mind-altering" drugs" to protesting patients, argued
that the permissibility of such treatment was implicit in com-
mitment, under the commitment standard which existed in that
jurisdiction.2 They further argued that halting treatment would
turn hospitals into warehouses, where untreated patients would
stay indefinitely.6 3
The plaintiffs, a group of mental patients and former
mental patients who had been forcibly subjected to these drugs,
sued for the restriction of the drugs' administration to situations
where necessary to prevent imminent injury from the patient's
behavior."' Plaintiffs also argued that the drugs had painful and
damaging side effects.
6 5
Both the district court6 and the court of appeals6 7 upheld
the plaintiffs' right to refuse the treatment. As the court of ap-
peals stated, it is an "intuitively obvious proposition: a person
has a constitutionally protected interest in being left free by the
state to decide for himself whether to submit to the serious and
potentially harmful medical treatment that is represented by ad-
ministration of antipsychotic drugs."6"
The court had more trouble delineating the source of consti-
tutional protection, but concluded that it must be found some-
where in the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment,
"most likely as part of the penumbral right to privacy, bodily
60. Rogers v. Okin, 634 F.2d 650 (1st Cir. 1980), vacated and remanded sub nom.
Mills v. Rogers, 457 U.S. 291 (1982).
61. Anti-psychotropic drugs are designed to reduce the level of psychotic thinking,
and include the drugs Thorazine and Haldol. See Rogers v. Okin, 478 F. Supp. 1342,
1359-60 (D. Mass. 1979), aff'd in relevant part, 634 F.2d 650, 653 (1st Cir. 1980).
62. See MAss. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 123, § 50 (West 1969), which provides for the
involuntary commitment of "any mentally ill person ... who in his [the judge's] opinion
is a proper subject for [institutional] treatment or custody."
63. 457 U.S. at 291, 293.
64. Id. at 293.
65. Id. These effects included muscle spasms, tremors and retarded volitional move-
ments. Id. at 293 n.1. According to one observer the damage may be even more funda-
mental: patients subject to this forced treatment not only suffered physically, but also
felt that, "their humanity was being offended" [and experienced] "a loss of self respect
and a feeling of powerlessness." N.Y. Times, March 21, 1982, § 6, at 46, col. 3.
66. Rogers v. Okin, 478 F. Supp. 1342 (D. Mass. 1979).
67. Rogers v. Okin, 634 F.2d 650 (1st Cir. 1980).
68. Id. at 653.
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integrity, or personal security." '69
The Supreme Court vacated the decision of the court of ap-
peals and remanded the case for further consideration in light of
In re Guardianship of Roe,70 a recent decision by the Massachu-
setts Supreme Court.7' The Supreme Court assumed, arguendo,
that "involuntarily committed mental patients do retain liberty
interests" which are protected by the federal Constitution." The
Court concluded, however, that it was unnecessary to define
those interests, or to identify and balance the interests of the
state, due to the Massachusetts decision.7 3 Justice Powell, writ-
ing for the Court, stated that "it would be inappropriate for us
to attempt to weigh or even to identify relevant liberty interests
that might be derived directly from the Constitution, indepen-
dent of any state law."'7 4 Since the Massachusetts State Consti-
tution provided greater protection, the federal constitutional is-
sue would not necessarily settle the dispute between the parties.
In Re Guardianship of Roe, 6 which prompted the Supreme
Court's remand in Miller, involved a mentally ill individual
whose permanent legal guardian had authorized forcible admin-
istration of antipsychotic medication after the individual had re-
peatedly refused such treatment.7 The court held that the men-
tally ill individual, who had not been committed to an
institution, could not be forced to submit to antipsychotic medi-
cation except in accordance with a court order to do so, issued
only after certain determinations had been made by the presid-
ing judge." These required determinations include either: 1)
that the affected individual would, if competent, accept antipsy-
chotic medication or 2) that there is a sufficiently important
state interest which would override the individual's refusal .7
The court based its analysis on three separate grounds: the con-
stitutional right to privacy, the inherent power of the court to
69. Id.
70. 383 Mass. 415, 421 N.E.2d 40 (1981).
71. See Mills v. Rogers, 457 U.S. at 299 n.16 (1982).
72. Id. at 305.
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. 383 Mass. 415, 421 N.E.2d 40 (1981).
76. Id. at 426, 421 N.E.2d at 50-51.
77. Id.
78. Id. at 61.
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regulate the practices of guardians, and the common law right to
make decisions regarding one's own body.79
The Supreme Court in Mills v. Rogers"0 stated that the Roe
analysis may affect the substantive protection of liberty interests
in Massachusetts as well as afford greater procedural safeguards
to mentally ill persons."' In this light, the Supreme Court va-
cated the circuit court's decision and remanded the action for
further consideration. 2 This decision, however, left unanswered
questions in the areas of civil and criminal commitment
procedure.
II. UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS
A. Issues and Problems
While attempts to protect the rights of mentally ill people
in the United States have centered mainly on the process by
which people are committed and adjudged mentally ill, efforts in
the Soviet Union have focused on a different issue: the state's
motive for commitment. Western attention has been drawn to
allegations of Soviet abuse of psychiatry in punishing and sub-
duing people who express unorthodox and politically unaccept-
able ideas.83 This has been called one of the "most cynical repri-
sals" against Soviet dissidents.8 4
One outspoken individual is Zhores Medvedev, a scientist
and dissident, who was diagnosed as having a split personality
reportedly because of his intellectual activity in the two differ-
ent activities of gerontology and politics.8 This diagnosis gave
rise to a popular characterization of the alleged condition as
79. Id. at 51 n.9.
80. 457 U.S. at 291.
81. Id. at 303.
82. Id. at 306. (The court in Mills failed to define the liberty interests or protections
afforded to mentally ill persons by the due process clause of the fifth amendment, but
the federal Constitution may still be invoked to protect state-created liberty interests
through the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment). Id. at 304. See, e.g., John-
son v. Brejle, No. 81-2798, slip op. at 4. (7th Cir. Feb. 18, 1983) (upholding a due process
claim of a defendant incompetent to stand trial, based on a "state created liberty inter-
est that is entitled to the protection of the federal due process clause"). Id. No. 81-2798,
slip op. at 12. (7th Cir. Feb. 18, 1983).
83. N.Y. Times, Jan. 30, 1983, § 6, at 20, col. 2.
84. J. RUBENSTEIN, SOVIET DISSIDENTS 135 (1980).
85. See generally id. at 137-47.
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"the Da Vinci Syndrome." ' Another unusual diagnosis was re-
ported in the case of a thirty-five year old man who had persist-
ently but unsuccessfully applied for permission to emigrate and
was committed in 1980 due to "emigration delusions. '1 7 One
source places the number of documented cases of individuals
"known to have been forcibly confined for political and not gen-
uine medical reasons" since 1969 at 305.88 Eighty-five of these
cases have occurred since 1979.9 According to another source:
Since 1962, at least four hundred perfectly sane men and
women have been declared insane by Soviet mental-
health authorities and committed to mental hospitals be-
cause of religious or political opinions. These dissidents
are not sentenced to a term of imprisonment, but are
"treated" until they "recover"-that is, until they recant
the offending beliefs. They are surrounded by the genu-
inely-often violently-insane. They are treated with
powerful tranquilizers that cripple the memory, lump the
emotions, scramble the powers of concentration, and un-
dermine the ability to think."'
The Soviet Union denies any such activity, and recently
withdrew from the World Psychiatric Association in response to
a pending motion to expel the country for abusing the practice
of psychiatry to crush political dissent.' The letter of with-
drawal stated that "there are no grounds for such slanderous at-
tacks." '92 There is, however, evidence to substantiate these alle-
gations.9 s The following analysis focuses on existing norms in the
Soviet Union.
B. Civil Commitment
Guidelines governing the compulsory civil commitment pro-
cedures in the Soviet Union are not available in complete form,
86. S. BLOCH & P. REDDAWAY, PSYCHIATRIC TERROR 177 (1977).
87. AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, POLITICAL ABUSE OF PSYCHIATRY IN THE U.S.S.R. 23
(March 9, 1983).
88. Id. at 3.
89. Id.
90. Frum, Who's Crazy Now?, 35 NAT'L REV. 44 (Jan. 21, 1983).
91. N.Y. Times, Feb. 11, 1983, § 1, at 8, col. 3.
92. N.Y. Times, Feb. 12, 1983, § 1, at 4, col. 1.
93. See, e.g., S. BLOCH & P. REDDAWAY, RUSSIA'S POLITICAL HOSPITALS 150-58 (1977).
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either to Soviet citizens or to those in the West. Some directives,
however, have reached the West in partial form."4 The danger of
deprivation of human rights seems to lie mainly in the extremely
vague definition of "mental illness," a problem that, as can be
seen, also haunts some American statutes. 5 The basic authoriza-
tion for commitment is expressed in the following directive:
If there is a clear danger from a mentally-ill person to
those around him or to himself, the health organs have
the right (by way of immediate psychiatric assistance) to
place him in a psychiatric hospital without the consent of
the person who is ill or his relatives or guardians. 6
As in many of its American counterparts, the Soviet standard
for compulsory commitment requires a showing of dangerous-
ness. 9 7 The authority to commit lies with the public health agen-
cies, although their attention may be drawn to an individual by
the individual's relatives, or by any other interested citizen. 8
The Soviet equivalent to a certificate of commitment must
be signed by a psychiatrist. In remote areas where there are no
psychiatrists available, a non-psychiatrist medical doctor may
authorize the commitment.'9 The committing doctor must pro-
vide full details, medical and social, for the commitment.100
Within twenty-four hours after the patient has been committed,
he must be examined by a panel of three psychiatrists, which
decides the appropriateness as well as the duration of the com-
mitment. Close relatives must be informed of the decision. The
patient must receive treatment and must be examined by a
panel of three psychiatrists at least once a month. When the pa-
tient's mental condition has improved, or when the social danger
has passed, the patient is to be released. 0
94. Id. at 153.
95. An example of this definitional vagueness is illustrated by Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. §
202.010 (1) (Baldwin 1972).
96. Directives on the Immediate Hospitalization of Mentally Ill Persons Who Are a
Social Danger (1970), partially reprinted in 28 KHRONIKA TEKUSHCHIKH SOBYTii 28-29
(1971) [hereinafter cited as KHRONIKA].
97. Id.
98. S. BLOCH & P. REDDAWAY, supra note 86; see also AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, supra
note 87 at 3-4.
99. S. BLOCH & P. REDDAWAY, supra note 86 at 152.
100. Id.
101. Id. at 153.
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After release, the former patient may be required to report
for outpatient care and/or have a guardian appointed.10 2 In addi-
tion, a civil release may be subject-unknown to the released in-
dividual-to a secret "rating" of dangerousness by a psychia-
trist, on a scale of one to five.'03 In turn, the security organs (the
police and the KGB) may use this and other information to ar-
rive at their own dangerousness rating.104 If this rating is high in
a certain area, for example, "a propensity to demonstrate, [the
former patient] will henceforth be liable to short internments
during big public holidays."105
As mentioned earlier, an ill-defined standard of "mental ill-
ness" is conducive to the violation of human rights. In the
U.S.S.R., the health organs have promulgated a "catalogue of in-
dications" such as delirium, pathological impulsiveness, and
other symptoms generally recognized by the psychiatric profes-
sion in various states.106 The catalogue also includes some psy-
chiatric phenomena which apparently are uniquely Soviet, such
as "hypochondriacal delirious conditions producing incorrect ag-
gressive attitudes to . . . official institutions. ' 10 7 According to
one source, this description may be used against people who are
too persistent when pressing their claims against a public
agency. 0 8
The directives on civil commitment further state that the
enumerated conditions in the catalogue of indications may exist
"with externally correct conduct and dissimulation.'' 9 The
meaning is plain and ominous: a psychiatrist may commit an in-
dividual on the basis of the observation of a "mental illness"
that has no symptoms." 0
It must be noted finally that the word of the psychiatrist is
final. There is no judicial review of civil commitments. This re-






107. Id. at 154.
108. Id.
109. KHRONIKA, supra note 96, at 40.
110. This argument was made in the case, e.g. of Natalya Gorbanevskaya. Samizdat,
Sud'nad Natalya Gorbanevskaya, 15 KHRONIKA TEKUSHCHIKH SOBYTIK 1-17 (1970).
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that persons with significant mental illness are not subject to or
protected by the law. .. .
C. Criminal Commitment
Although the promulgation of criminal codes in the U.S.S.R.
is controlled by the constituent republics, there is a federal
model code. The following excerpt from the Criminal Code of
the Russian Republic is fairly representative of the codes of the
various republics.
Article 11 of the Criminal Code of the Russian Soviet Fed-
erated Socialist Republic provides as follows:
A person shall not be subject to criminal responsibility
who at the time of committing a socially dangerous act is
in a state of non-responsibility, that is, cannot realize the
significance of his actions or control them because of a
chronic mental illness, temporary mental derangement,
mental deficiency or other condition of illness. Compul-
sory measures of a medical character may be applied to
such a person by order of the court.112
Thus, a showing of non-responsibility involves two ele-
ments. First, the defendant must have actually committed crimi-
nal acts. Second, while committing the acts, the defendant must
have been suffering from a mental illness which prevented him
from appreciating their significance and/or prevented him from
controlling his behavior.
The right to initiate the psychiatric examination rests solely
with the court and the investigating organs. Although the defen-
dant may request a psychiatric consultation, the court is free to
refuse the request.11 In all cases, a defendant has no right to
call a chosen psychiatrist for the examination or for later
testimony.""
The examination, upon court order, is conducted by a com-
mission of three to four psychiatrists who make a report to the
111. V. CHALIDZE, To DEFEND THESE RIGHTS 274 (1974).
112. CRIM. CODE OF THE RUSSIAN REPUB. art. 11, reprinted in S. BLOCH & P. RED-
DAWAY, supra note 86, at 98.




court." 5 The court is free to accept or reject this report."' If the
court finds the defendant non-responsible, it has the discretion
to have the defendant committed to a mental hospital, or re-
leased to the custody of relatives or a guardian." 7 Relatives or
others may petition for an end to the compulsory hospitaliza-
tion, but again the court may refuse the request." 8 The patient,
as in a civil commitment setting, has no right of appeal, appar-
ently on the reasoning that since he has been classified as non-
responsible, he is unfit to submit legally valid documents." 9 The
defendant is committed for an unspecified time period until re-
covery occurs. This situation could involve lifetime commitment.
If the criminally committed patient is later released, the
court may order the patient to be "put on the psychiatric regis-
ter." 20 Under this procedure, the individual has the legal obliga-
tion to obey the orders of the local psychiatric clinic.' 2' There
may also be a "dangerousness rating" applied to the former pa-
tient, as discussed under civil commitment. 22
III. ATTEMPTS TO DEVELOP INTERNATIONAL NORMS
Various organizations have produced draft guidelines for
the protection of rights of the mentally ill. For purposes of com-
parison, this article will discuss material from three sourses: the
International Commission of Jurists Draft Guidelines for the
Protection of Persons Suffering from Mental Disorder [Draft
Guidelines),2  the Proposed Standards for Adequate Treat-
ment of the Mentally Ill of Amici Curiae, American Orthopsy-
chiatric Association, American Civil Liberties Union [Proposed
Standards],' and the Opinion of the Moscow Human Rights
115. Id.
116. Id. at 100.
117. Id. at 101.
118. Id.
119. Id.
120. Id. at 102.
121. Id.
122. Id.
123. Draft Guidelines for the Protection of Persons Suffering from Mental Disorder
(1980) (on file with the Int'l Commission of Jurists), reprinted in 10 ICJ NEWSLETrER 44
(1981) [hereinafter cited as Draft Guidelines].
124. Proposed Standards for Adequate Treatment of the Mentally Ill of Amici Cu-
riae, American Orthopsychiatric Association, American Civil Liberties Union (1973), Wy-
att v. Stickney, 344 F. Supp. 373 (M.D. Ala. 1972) and 344 F. Supp. 387 (M.D. Ala. 1972)
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Committee Concerning the Problem of Persons Declared Men-
tally Ill [Moscow Human Rights Committee]."
A. Standards for Involuntary Commitment
The Draft Guidelines and the Proposed Standards substan-
tially agree as to what must be demonstrated before involuntary
commitment is permissible. The Draft Guidelines call for a
showing that the patient be: 1) suffering from a severe mental
disorder which requires his admission for treatment or care; 2) a
substantial risk of serious harm to himself or another person ex-
ists if he is not admitted; and 3) that he be unable or unwilling
to consent to voluntary hospitalization.'26
The Moscow Human Rights Committee formulates the
standard that "legal restrictions on the rights of persons de-
clared mentally ill or incompetent are permissible only to the
extent absolutely necessary for the protection of their rights, for
the protection of the rights of others, or for the safety of the
public.' 27 It must be noted that this standard applies to "per-
sons declared mentally ill," and not to those yet to be declared
mentally ill. Presumably, those not yet declared mentally ill
would enjoy at least as many rights under this standard as those
already declared mentally ill.
The requirements suggested by the Proposed Standards are
that the individual be: 1) suffering from a mental disorder; and
2) that he represent a danger to himself or others as a result of
the mental disorder. 28 The Proposed Standards adds a require-
ment not mentioned in the other two sources that the "facility
to which he is to be committed is equipped and staffed to pro-
vide adequate treatment.' ' 2 9 It seems likely, however, that the
Draft Guidelines accomplished substantially the same result by
(on file with the ACLU), partially reprinted in SILVERBERG supra note 2, at 243 [herein-
after cited as Proposed Standards].
125. Opinion of the Moscow Human Rights Committee Concerning the Problem of
Persons Declared Mentally Ill (July 3, 1971) (on file with the Int'l League for Human
Rights, United Nations), reprinted in V. CHALIDZE, supra note 111, at 281 [hereinafter
cited as Moscow Human Rights Comm.].
126. Draft Guidelines, supra note 123, art. 13.
127. Moscow Human Rights Comm., supra note 125, at 282.




a careful definition of "care centre"130 to include, among other
things, "the staff, equipment and space needed to provide pa-
tients with a programme of active therapy." '' No such provision
exists in the Moscow Human Rights Committee formulation, al-
though it does express "the right to humane treatment.' l3 2 In
this context, however, the word "treatment" is ambiguous, and
could mean either medical or therapeutic treatment, or simply
being treated in a humane way. The first two formulations con-
sider the problem of "warehousing" people, or keeping patients
in custody despite a total lack of treatment.
B. Authority to Commit
According to the Moscow Human Rights Committee,
only those agencies are competent to establish the fact of
mental illness which: are empowered by law to decide
questions concerning the restriction of legal competence
and the capacity to act; are protected by law from subor-
dination to the executive power; and are not organs of
the executive power. 8
This expresses the general principle that the power to commit
should not be left in the hands of a wide range of individuals or
agencies, and that it should not be subject to arbitrary and in-
consistent exercise.
The Draft Guidelines envision a limitation of the power of
commitment to "a judicial or other authority prescribed by law
which is independent of the hospital and the detaining author-
ity. .... -14 Again, the independence of the committing author-
ity from the detaining (or, using the Moscow Human Rights
Committee's term, the "executive") authority is explicit.
The Proposed Standards version differs slightly, yet is at-
tentive to the same problem in affirming the "right to a judicial
hearing prior to commitment. '" 3 5
130. Draft Guidelines, supra note 123, art. 6.
131. Id.
132. Moscow Human Rights Comm., supra note 125, at 288.
133. Id. at 285.
134. Draft Guidelines, supra note 123, art. 14.
135. Proposed Standards, supra note 124, at 243.
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C. Burden of Proof
Although the Draft Guidelines are silent on the question of
the burden of proof, other works attempt to deal with this diffi-
cult area. It seems important to establish a fundamental princi-
ple that, in the words of the Moscow Human Rights Committee,
"[a]t no stage of a proceeding for determination of the fact of
mental illness or mental deficiency of an individual. . . can the
burden of proof of mental soundness be placed on the individual
or his representative. "1 6 In other words, no one should be
placed in the position of having to prove a negative: that he is
not mentally ill.
The Proposed Standards, assuming the existence of this ba-
sic doctrine, offers a more detailed version: involuntary commit-
ment based on dangerousness cannot be made unless that dan-
gerousness is demonstrated beyond a reasonable doubt. 37 This
standard is generally mandated for criminal conviction and is, of
course, the highest evidentiary standard in the American justice
system.
On a related point, the Moscow Human Rights Committee
states a desired presumption not considered by the Draft Guide-
lines and the Proposed Standards: "[e]veryone has the right to
be considered mentally healthy and mentally sound as long as
lawful procedure has not determined to the contrary."' This is
analogous to the presumption of innocence in a criminal pro-
ceeding, and is a prerequisite for a rational and just burden of
proof rule.
D. Specific Procedural Protections
There is substantial agreement among the three documents
on several necessary procedural guarantees. In the context of the
United States the Proposed Standards would recommend that
all existing due process protections be applied to the mentally
ill. The Proposed Standards enumerate certain rights of
"[e]very person subject to commitment," with the reminder that
the list of rights is not exhaustive.3 9 The first right is the right
136. Moscow Human Rights Comm., supra note 125, at 285.
137. Proposed Standards, supra note 124, at 243.
138. Moscow Human Rights Comm., supra note 125, at 284.
139. Proposed Standards, supra note 124, at 243.
19831
HUMAN RIGHTS ANNUAL
to counsel, with a provision for appointed counsel for poor
people. 140
The Moscow Human Rights Committee also affirms the
right of a person to "qualified legal counsel." '' It does not men-
tion appointment, probably because all attorneys in the Soviet
system are employees of the state. The Moscow Human Rights
Committee goes on to state that the "right of a person or his
representative to become familiar with all case material concern-
ing determination of the fact of mental illness""" must be recog-
nized, as well as the right to a "reasonable opportunity for par-
ticipation"'1 8 in the case, the right to be present during
consideration of the case, and the right to public disclosure of
the case. "
The Proposed Standards phrases the above protections in
terms of the right to prior notice, the right to subpoena and
cross-examine witnesses, and to present evidence, including ex-
pert testimony (at public expense if necessary). 45 In addition,
protection against self-incrimination in a criminal proceeding
from anything said during a commitment hearing is included
among the enumerated rights.'" Another provision in the Pro-
posed Standards, absent from the Draft Guidelines or the Mos-
cow Human Rights Committee, provides that a "person subject
to commitment may waive assigned counsel, but only if he does
so. . . knowing[ly] and intelligent[ly]."" 7
According to the Draft Guidelines, "the patient shall be en-
titled to be represented by a lawyer" who shall be "entitled to be
present throughout the hearing and to see all docu-
ments. . . . 148 This right is especially important in light of the
specific provision of the Draft Guidelines that the court may ex-
clude a person subject to commitment from attending the hear-
ing and seeing documents when the court "considers it would
140. Id.




145. Proposed Standards, supra note 124, at 244.
146. Id.
147. Id. at 243.
148. Draft Guidelines, supra note 123, art. 27.
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pose a substantial risk of harm to the patient.""' This section,
which is unique to the Draft Guidelines, adds that "[t]he pa-
tient shall be entitled to be heard personally by the court."
150
While the Moscow Human Rights Committee proposal guaran-
tees "public disclosure" of the case,151 the Draft Guidelines
states that "[i]f the patient requests that a particular person be
present at the hearing the court shall admit that person. . . ."5
This proposed guarantee is, however, subject to the court's dis-
cretion: "unless [the court] considers that there is no justifica-
tion for his presence or that it would be prejudicial to the pa-
tient's state of health."1 3 The Proposed Standards limits the
individual's right to have requested persons at the hearing to
"all persons recommending hospitalization.""
E. The Right to Appeal
All three sets of proposals agree on the right of review. The
Proposed Standards guarantees "an expedited appeal," 1' and is
the only proposal to mandate a speedy review. The Moscow
Human Rights Committee states that "the right to initiate pro-
ceedings for review of a decision" should be recognized.'" This
existing right, however, is not the same as a right to the review
itself, since there is no requirement that the proceedings, once
initiated, be accepted, responded to, or completed. The review-
ing authority is also not specified. The formulation, however, is
an apparent attempt to express two concepts: that there be es-
tablished by law an independent mechanism for purposes of re-
view, and that the patient be recognized as an appropriate party
to set the review machinery in motion.
The Draft Guidelines also raises related issues. Under this
proposal, "the patient, assisted by a court-appointed counselor,
or any interested person shall have the right to appeal to a court
against the decision to admit him to a hospital as an involuntary
149. Id.
150. 'Id.
151. Moscow Human Rights Comm., supra note 125, at 287.
152. Draft Guidelines, supra note 123, art 27.
153. Id.
154. Proposed Standards, supra note 124, at 244.
155. Id.
156. Moscow Human Rights Comm., supra note 125, at 284, 285.
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patient."' 5 7 The first issue that arises concerns the rationale in
allowing the court to appoint counsel. The Draft Guidelines may
merely be attempting to ensure counsel for those who could not
otherwise afford it. It is possible, however, that the court's
choice might not be the most beneficial to the patient. 58
The second issue concerns the statement that "any inter-
ested person shall have the right to appeal. . . . 1'5 The goal of
this section seems to be to allow third parties to intervene on
behalf of the patient or to act in the patient's interest when he is
is unable to do so himself. The words themselves are not so lim-
ited, however, and they might allow antagonistic parties to inter-
vene (e.g., a prosecuting authority in a criminal matter who
would like the patient to be tried on criminal charges). The for-
mer interpretation is more desirable from a human rights per-
spective, and should be made explicit.
IV. CONCLUSION
A synthesis of the three sets of proposals would produce a
highly desirable international norm concerning the rights of the
mentally ill. Specifically, the Draft Guidelines would offer ap-
propriate and necessary protection to the mentally ill if the fol-
lowing changes were made. Primarily, the relevant committing
authority must be required to bear the burden of proving an in-
dividual to be mentally ill, against a presumption of mental
health.'10 Secondly, the right of the potential committee 6' and/
or that person's representative to be present at the judicial pro-
ceeding must be mandated.' Finally, it should be made explicit
that the person subject to the commitment proceedings be enti-
tled to select counsel, or to the right to contest the court's
choice, if appointment is necessary.
Many atrocities have taken place in the past concerning the
mentally ill, including castration, neglect, sexual abuse, and soli-
tary confinement of victims too deficient to protect themselves.
157. Draft Guidelines, supra note 123, art. 26.
158. V. CHALIDZE, supra note 111, at 3-4.
159. Draft Guidelines, supra note 123, art. 26.
160. Moscow Human Rights Comm., supra note 125, at 284, 285.
161. Proposed Standards, supra note 124, at 244.
162. Moscow Human Rights Comm., supra note 125, at 287; Draft Guidelines, supra
note 123, art. 27.
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Other situations are less violent, but no less tragic. Involuntary
commitment with no opportunity to refute the evidence, or
bring in expert testimony, not only causes human suffering, but
also pits the power of the state against the individual, without
providing adequate legal recourse. Both judicial and popular at-
tention to these issues is vital in order to prevent future abuses.
Detailed prescriptions are a necessary safeguard in this area.
The promulgation of such norms as those examined in this
article is necessary as an important step in the protection of the
mentally ill. Even if individual states refuse to recognize any
given norm as binding, the existence of that norm would supply
individuals with something to substantiate their demands. In
addition, they provide a useful basis of comparison and help to
stimulate discussion and elevate expectations. Although the ulti-
mate goal is the formulation of actual restraints on the states'
authority to commit persons, the development of these and com-
parable norms is an important first step.
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